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obstacles it thought precedent had established 183 and decided that
legislative policy required that such salesmen on commission
"should not be insulated from creditor claims when ordinary wage
earners are not."' 8 4 The court further held that, even where there
is a genuine system of loans made by the employer, with a fixed
obligation of repayment, the employer, once he is on notice of the
judgment creditor's claim, is bound by the statute to withhold
the ten per cent. Finally, the court in Goldwater developed a
simple, practical formula delineating the exact extent to which such
a drawing account is subject to income execution. Under the
Goldwater rule,
once the advances prior to execution [are] fully repaid, the employer [is]
bound to honor that execution and apply ten per cent not of the weekly
drawings, but of the employee's actual 8earnings
by way of commission there5
after until the execution was satisfied.'

What the court did in Goldwater was to develop a viable
formula to replace the vague case law which surrounded CPA
§ 684. The Goldwater rule offers an effective solution to the problems which drawing account situations have hitherto caused in
income execution. It is fair to the employers who make these
advances, since only the earnings of their employees after the levy
is made are subject to the ten per cent withholding provision. It
relegates the employee receiving these drawing-account advances
to the same position as any ordinary wage earner for the purposes
of income execution. Finally, it provides judgment creditors with
an effective tool with which to reach the income of judgment debtors
who are paid by this drawing account arrangement.
ARTICLE 75 -

ARBITRATION

CPLR 7510.: One-year statute of limitations runs from date
arbitratorsrender final determination and not from date of
original award.
Under prior law, the arbitrators' authority to alter or review
an award terminated once their decision was announced. 86 If any
formal errors were involved in the decision, such as mathematical
mistakes or defects in form, an application to correct the defects
could be made to the court.' 87 In any event, it was necessary to
petition the court to confirm the award within one year from the
2s3Id. at 671, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
18Id. at 672, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
's5Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
186 SEcomND REP. 144.
187 CPLR 7511 (c).
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date of decision. Otherwise, the adverse party could defend on the
ground of the statute of limitations.'8 The justification for this
one-year period of limitation, retained in the CPLR, lies in the
fact that arbitration is designed as an expeditious method of disposing of disputes and therefore, a motion on the award should
not be brought years later."5 9
CPLR 7509 was enacted in order to relieve court congestion
by giving the arbitrators, upon timely application of a party, the
power to correct mere formal errors in their original decision.
They cannot, however, "re-examine the grounds of the award or
• . . alter the decision." 190 Since the award must be confirmed
within a year from the decision pursuant to CPLR 7510, the enactment of CPLR 7509 also affects the commencement date of the
statute of limitations.
In Belli v. Matthew Bender & Co.,' 91 petitioner moved for
confirmation of an arbitration award pursuant to CPLR 7510.
Notice of the award had been forwarded to the parties on October
29, 1963. Within twenty days after notice, respondent, under
CPLR 7509, requested modification of the award. On December
10, 1963, the arbitrators reaffirmed their initial decision. Thereafter, on November 25, 1964, the present motion was made. Respondent opposed the motion on the ground that it should have
been made within one year from the date of the original award.
The court rejected the respondent's contention, holding that the
statute of limitations commences upon the arbitrators' decision on
a section 7509 application. The court reasoned that since the
revisers expressly authorized the court to stay proceedings involving
arbitration while an application is pending before the arbitrators,
they impliedly intended the statute to run from final disposition.
Otherwise, the confirmation time would be extended only by the
arbitrators' actual modification, but no extension could occur if the
arbitrators, as in this case, considered the application but refused
to alter the decision.
This new procedure, therefore, allows the parties more time
in which to submit an application to confirm an award and thus
delays enforcement of the arbitration award.192
188 CPLR 7510. In order to prevent circumvention of the one-year confirmation period CPLR 215(5) was enacted. 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 7510,

commentary 588 (1963).
189 See 8 WENSTEI, KORN
(1965).
19D SECOND REP. 144.
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App. Div. 2d 72, 263 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1st Dep't 1965).
See 8 WmxNsmN, KoRN & MLnaER, NEw YoRK Civ PAcricE 7509.03
(1965), wherein the authors express the view that the court should determine
the motion if an application made to the arbitrators pursuant to CLPR 7509
is used solely for delay.
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